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ABSTRACT 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
This paper explains four things in a unified way. First, how e-commerce can generate price 
equilibria, where physical shops either compete with virtual shops for consumers with Internet 
access, or alternatively, sell only to consumers with no Internet access. Second, how these price 
equilibria might involve price dispersion on-line. Third, why prices may be higher on-line. Fourth, 
why established firms can, but need not, be more reluctant than newly created firms to adopt e-
commerce. For this purpose we develop a model where e-commerce reduces consumers’ search 
costs, involves trade-offs for consumers, and reduces retailing costs. 
 
 
 
RESUMEN 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Este trabajo explica, de manera unificada, cuatro cosas. Primero, cómo el comercio electrónico 
puede generar equilibrios de precios en los que las tiendas físicas compiten con las tiendas virtuales 
por los consumidores con acceso a Internet, o, alternativamente, venden sólo a los clientes que no 
tienen acceso a Internet. Segundo, cómo estos equilibrios de precios pueden generar dispersión de 
precios en Internet. Tercero, por qué los precios de las tiendas virtuales pueden ser más altos que 
los de las tiendas físicas. Y cuarto, por qué las empresas establecidas pueden tener menos 
incentivos que las empresas de nuevas creación para abrir tiendas virtuales. Para ello, 
desarrollamos un modelo en el que el comercio electrónico reduce los costes de búsqueda de los 
consumidores, implica un trade-off para los consumidores, y disminuye los costes de producción de 
las empresas. 
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1 Introduction 
 The Internet allowed the creation of a new retailing technology: electronic commerce (e-commerce)2. E-
commerce has similarities with catalogue retailing. Without a physical shop, it offers products that cannot be 
physically inspected or immediately delivered, and are paid for usually with a credit card. But e-commerce also has 
unique attributes. The Internet allows to cheaply store, search, and disseminate information; is available anywhere, 
anytime, for anyone who can accede to it; allows interactivity; provides perceptual experiences superior to those of a 
catalogue, but inferior to those of physical inspection; and serves as a transactions and physical distribution medium 
for information goods3. Due to this last aspect, conceivably, it will be in markets for information goods that e-
commerce will have a bigger impact, as the recent evolution of markets for stocks, mortgages, or life insurance 
suggests (Brown & Goolsbee (2000)). 
 Four facts have emerged from e-commerce’s short history. First, typically newly created, purely virtual 
firms, adopted e-commerce before established firms. In the book retail industry, new firms like Amazon adopted e-
commerce before old firms like Barnes & Noble, and in the stockbroking retail industry, new firms like E*trade also 
adopted e-commerce before old firms like Charles Schwab. Did this reflect an intrinsic reluctance of established 
firms to adopt e-commerce? If not, what did it depend on? Second, sometimes physical shops reacted to e-
commerce by lowering their prices, to compete with virtual shops for consumers that buy on-line; other times, they 
did not lower their prices, and concentrated on selling only to consumers that do not buy on-line. Charles Schwab 
lowered the off-line fee from $65 to $30 to match the on-line fee (New York Times, August 16, 1999), which 
suggests the first price regime. In 1999, Barnes & Noble and Borders matched within hours an Amazon 50% 
discount on best sellers on their virtual, but not on their physical shops (The New York Times, May 18, 1999). This 
suggests that established firms compete with new firms for consumers with Internet access on their virtual shops, but 
not on their physical shops, i.e., the second price regime. What explains these different price regimes? Third, there is 
price dispersion on-line. Brynjolfsson & Smith (1999) find that established firms’ virtual shops charge 8.7% more 
                                                 
2 Transacting products based on the processing and transmission of digitized data over the network of computers that use the transmission control protocol/Internet protocol, 
TCP/IP. 
3 Goods that can be digitized, i.e., expressed as zeros and ones. 
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than new firms’ virtual shops, and that on-line the price range is 33% of the average price4. What explains price 
dispersion on-line, if supposedly, the Web gives consumers access to perfect information? Fourth, prices are lower 
on-line. Brynjolfsson & Smith (1999) find that prices average 9-16% less on virtual shops than on physical shops. Is 
this price reduction intrinsic to e-commerce? If not, what does it depend of? 
 We believe that these four facts are related, and develop a static, homogeneous product, partial equilibrium 
search model, that explains them in a unified way. The model has three important aspects: e-commerce reduces 
consumers’ search costs, involves trade-offs for consumers, and reduces retailing costs. E-commerce reduces 
consumers’ search costs, because on the Web consumers can visit at a low cost virtual shops and learn prices5, or 
can use shopbots, software agents that automatically search for price information6. E-commerce involves trade-offs 
for consumers, because buying from a virtual shop does not require a shopping trip, but requires waiting for delivery. 
E-commerce reduces retailing costs, compared to physical shops, because virtual shops allow savings on property 
costs, i.e., leases and acquisition of shop and warehouse space, on labor costs, i.e., personnel to attend shops, and on 
inventory costs, i.e., inventories for showcasing or immediate delivery7. 
 In our model, firms decide whether to open virtual shops and set prices, and consumers search for prices. 
There are two consumer types: new consumers have Internet access, old consumers do not, or do not consider using 
the Internet an option. New consumers canvass prices through the Web, and then decide if they buy from a virtual or 
a physical shop. There are two firms: the old firm has a physical shop, the new firm does not. Virtual shops have 
lower marginal production costs than physical shops. 
 Since search and waiting for delivery are costly, new consumers accept prices above the minimum charged 
in the market. This gives firms market power. 
 The virtual shops’ pricing behavior is simple. Virtual shops have the lowest cost and charge the lowest price. 
Thus, they are not constrained by consumer search, and charge their monopoly price. 
                                                 
4 Other empirical studies are: Brown & Goolsbee (2000), Clemons, Hann & Hitt (1999), Friberg, Ganslandt & Sandstrom (2000), and Morton, Zettekmeyer & Risso (2000). 
5 Yahoo Internet Life, August 19 1999, reports that it took 32 minutes to find a hotel in New York using “the old way”, while only 6 minutes using “the net way”. 
6 E.g., ClickTheButton, DealPilot , www.previewtravel.com for airfares, and www.microsurf.com for mortgages. 
7 On the Web, a banking transaction costs $.1, compared with $.27 at an ATM o r $.52 over the phone, and processing an airline ticket costs $1, compared with $8 through a travel 
agent (The Economist, June 26, 1999). USA retailers with no physical presence in a state do not collect local sales taxes, 6%. 
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 The physical shop’s pricing behavior depends of whether the old firm has a virtual shop, and on whether the 
new firm is in the market. Because new consumers have access to lower cost shops, and if waiting for delivery is 
not too costly, they only accept buying from a physical shop for a lower price than old consumers. When only the 
new firm opens a virtual shop, if the physical shop charges a lower price acceptable to both consumer types, it earns 
a lower per consumer profit, if it charges a higher price acceptable only to old consumers, it earns a higher per 
consumer profit. Thus, the physical shop trades-off volume of sales and per consumer profit; sometimes it chooses 
to sell to all consumers, and sometimes only to old consumers. When both firms open virtual shops, the old firm faces 
an additional effect, besides the volume of sales and per consumer profit effects. If its physical shop charges a lower 
price acceptable to both consumer types, half of the new consumers it sells to would otherwise buy from the old 
firm’s virtual shop, where per consumer profit is higher. This causes the old firm to have its physical shop charge a 
lower price to attract new consumers, only if the virtual shops’ cost reduction is small; otherwise it prefers to sell to 
new consumers only from its virtual shop. We argue that these price equilibria are different from others in search 
theory, where firms face consumers with different reservation prices. 
 If the new and old firms’ virtual shops have different costs, there will be price dispersion on-line 
 Since information goods are more convenient to buy on-line, physical shops must charge lower prices than 
virtual shops to be able to sell them to new consumers. 
 The firms’ incentives to open virtual shops depend on the virtual shops' cost reduction, and the new 
consumers’ reservation price. If cost reduction is small, the new firm has more incentives to open a virtual shop; if 
cost reduction is large, and the new consumers’ reservation price is high, this is no longer true. In fact, the old firm 
can choose to open a virtual shop when the new firm does not. 
 The model has two novel features. First, it captures some of the consumers’ and firms’ trade-offs regarding 
e-commerce. Second, the production and the search cost distributions are endogenous. 
 Section 2 presents the basic model, where reservation prices are exogenous, and section 3 characterizes its 
equilibria. Section 4 discusses the firms’ incentives to open virtual shops. Section 5 allows the new and old firm to 
operate the new technology at different costs. Section 6 presents the model with endogenous reservation prices. 
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Section 7 discusses price equilibria for information goods. Section 8 discusses related literature. Proofs are in the 
Appendix. 
 
2 The Basic Model 
 In this section we formalize the firms’ opening of a virtual shop and pricing decisions, given consumers’ 
reservation prices, as a 2 stage game. Later we will insert this Basic model in a larger game that includes a third 
stage, where reservation prices are determined. 
 
(a) The Setting 
 Consider a retail market for a homogeneous search good that opens for 1 period. 
 There are 2 alternative retailing technologies8: a New, virtual shop based technology, and an Old, physical 
shop based technology. A Virtual Shop has a Web site, where consumers can observe prices and buy, and its 
logistics is based on the Web. A Physical Shop has a physical location, where consumers can observe prices and 
buy, and its logistics is based on the physical world. A physical shop may have a Web site, but only to post prices9. A 
firm is Old if it has a physical shop, opened before the game, and New if it does not. 
 The game has 2 stages. In stage 1 firms choose whether to open virtual shops. In stage 2 firms choose 
prices. Then consumers buy, delivery takes place, agents receive their payoffs and the market closes. 
 Subscript j refers to firms and we index a new and an old firm by:   n,o . Subscripts t refers to shops and we 
index a new firm’s virtual shop, an old firm’s virtual shop, and a physical shop by:   vn,vo, p . 
 
(b) Consumers 
 There is a unit measure continuum of risk neutral consumers of 2 types. New consumers, a proportion 
  
l Î 0 ,1( ], have Internet access; Old consumers do not. At price p a consumer demands   D(p), where     D (.)  is a 
differentiable, decreasing, bounded function, with a bounded inverse. 
 Consumers ignore the prices of individual shops, and can only learn them by visiting the shops. Old 
consumers visit the physical shop’s physical location, and if offered a price no higher than   r , where   D(r) º 0 , buy 
                                                 
8 Technologies that make products available for use or consumption. This concept is related to that of a distribution channel (see Kotler (1994)). 
9 Bailey (1998) and Brynjolfsson & Smith (1999) found that, e.g., Cody’s and Powell’s Books, posted prices on the Web, but only sold at their physical locations. 
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and receive the product. When there are no virtual shops, new consumers behave similarly. Otherwise new 
consumers canvass prices through the Web10. They have the list of Web sites, obtained, e.g., from a search engine, 
but do not know to which type of shop the directions correspond11. We assume that: 
(H.1) Each new consumers picks randomly which Web site to visit, from the set he has not sampled yet. 
The new consumers’ reservation price for a type t shop is   rt . When new consumers visit a new (old) firm’s virtual 
shop, if offered a price no higher than   rvn  (  rvo ), they buy, and wait for delivery; when they visit a physical shop’s 
Web site, if offered a price no higher than   rp , they go to the shop’s physical location, buy, and receive the product; 
otherwise they reject the offer and search again12. Visiting a Web site or a physical shop’s physical location, and 
waiting for delivery of the product bought from a virtual shop, involve costs which we will ignore until section 6. 
 
(c) Firms 
 There are 2 risk neutral firms: a new and an old firm. If the new firm decides not to open a virtual shop, it 
exits the game with a 0 payoff. Opening a virtual shop involves a set-up cost, 
  
K Î 0 ,+¥( ). The probability with 
which firm j opens a virtual shop is   aj ; let   
a = a n , a o( ). At the end of stage 1   a  is observed by all players. If at least 
1 virtual shop opens, the physical shop creates its own Web site, where it posts its price. 
 Marginal production costs are constant for both shop types. The marginal cost of shop t is   ct . A virtual shop 
has a lower marginal cost than a physical shop. Let 
  
cp Î 0 , r( ) and   cvn = c vo = c v = c p - Dc , where   cp  is the common 
production cost, and 
  
D c Î 0 , c p( ] is the production cost reduction induced by the new technology. All players know 
  
c p ,cv( ). 
 The old firm can charge different prices at its 2 shops13. Shop t’s price and per consumer profit are   pt  and 
  p ( pt ;ct ) := ( pt - ct)D( pt ) . Let    
) 
p t := ar g ma x p  p ( p ; c t ) . Assume that   p(.)  is strictly quasi-concave in p, and that 
                                                 
10 In 2000, about half of the US car buyers will use the Internet. Most of them not to buy, but to obtain information to bargain lower prices out of local dealers (The Economist, 
February 14, 1998). 
11 At the end of section 6 we explain the role of the assumptions that consumers do not know beforehand to which type of shops the Web sites correspond, that the physical shop 
has a Web site, and that when there are virtual shops, new consumers canvass prices through the Web. 
12 As an alternative to sequential search new consumers could use shopbots, which in our context could be thought of as using a newspaper search technology (Braverman (1980), 
Salop & Stiglitz (1977), Wilde & Schwartz (1979)), i.e., perfect information at a fixed cost. Th is, however, contrasts with the reality of e-commerce (Brynjolfsson & Smith (1999)). 
Shopbots are useful to limit the set of shops under consideration, but it is unclear that consumers will buy through them. Aspects like the return policy or post sale services, can 
only be learned at the firms’ sites. In addition, some vendors block shopbots from searching their sites. 
13 Barnesandnoble.com charges different prices than Barnes and Noble’s physical shops. 
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even for the maximum cost reduction the physical shop can charge   
) 
p v  without losses, i.e.,   
cp <
) 
p v  for   Dc = cp . 
Shop t’s expected consumer share and expected profit are:   ft ( p t )  and    P ( p t ; ct ) := p( p t ; c t ) ft ( p t ) . The new and 
old firm’s net expected profits are: 
    
V n := P ( p vn ; c v ) - K[ ]a n  and 
    
V o := P ( p p ; c p ) + P ( p vo ; cv )[ - K ]a o . 
 A firm’s stage 1 strategy, is a rule that for every firm type, says with which probability a firm should open a 
virtual shop. A firm’s stage 2 strategy, is a rule that for each history and shop type, says which price a shop should 
charge. A firm's payoff is expected profit, net of the investment expenditure. 
 
(d) Equilibrium 
 A subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is: an opening and a pricing rule, for each shop and firm type, 
    
a j
* , p t
*( )j = n, o ;  t = v n , v o , p{ }, such that:  
(E.1) Given any   rt  and a, firms choose   pt
*  to solve problems: 
  
max pvn  V
n  and 
    
ma x { p vo , p p}  V
o ; 
(E.2) Given any   rt , and   pt
* , firms choose 
  
aj
*  to solve problem: 
  
maxa
j
V j . 
 
3 Equilibrium of the Basic Model 
 In this section we construct the basic model’s equilibrium by working backwards. First, given reservation 
prices and the profile of opening of virtual shops decisions, we derive the firms' equilibrium prices. Virtual shops 
charge their monopoly price. The physical shop charges sometimes the new consumers’ reservation price, 
sometimes its monopoly price. Second, given reservation prices and equilibrium prices, we derive the firms’ 
equilibrium opening of virtual shop’s rule. Either firm sometimes opens a virtual shop, sometimes does not. There are 
6 types of equilibria, depending on whether firms choose to open a virtual shop, and whether the physical shop sells 
to all or only to old consumers. 
 
3.1 Stage 2: The Price Game 
 In this sub-section we characterize equilibrium prices. 
 The number of shops that charge a price acceptable to new consumers, i.e.,   pt £ rt ,   t= v n ,v o , p , is a . If 
virtual shop   t charges a price higher than   rt , it makes no sales; if it charges a price no higher than   rt , given (H.1) 
and that there is a continuum of new consumers, its expected consumer share is   l /a . Thus, for   0 < a : 
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f t ( p ;rt ) =
0      Ü  rt < p
l/a Ü  p £ rt
    t = vn, vo
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
(we omit a  and l  in   ft ). 
 If the physical shop charges a price higher than   r , it makes no sales; if it charges a price higher than   
rp , but 
no higher than   r , it sells to old consumers,   1- l ; if it charges a price no higher than the   rp , its expected consumer 
share is   l /a + 1 - l . Thus, for   0 < a : 
  f r l r
l a l r
p p p
p
(p; )
0                r < p
1            p r
/ 1 p
=
Ü
- Ü < £
+ - Ü £
ì
í
ï
î
ï
 
(we omit a , l  and   r  in   fp ). 
 We assume that 
  
rp <
) 
p p , which rules out the uninteresting cases, where although virtual shops exist, the 
physical shop is able to sell to new consumers at 
  
) 
p p , its monopoly price. We assume also that   rt  is strictly higher 
than the lowest of the prices consumers can find if they search: 
(H.2) 
  
min p ¢ t { }< rt     ¢ t ¹ t  
This assumption rules out equilibria which are not subgame perfect in the larger model, if search and waiting for 
delivery are costly. It follows that costly search and impatience give firms market power14, since they lead new 
consumers to accept prices above the minimum charged in the market. By (H.2),   0 < a . 
 When neither firm opens a virtual shop, 
  
a = 0 , 0( ), the industry is a monopoly. The number of shops that 
charge a price acceptable to new consumers when firms play 
  
an , ao( ) in stage 1 is   a a n a o ;   a 00 = 1 . 
 Next we examine the case where only the new firm opens a virtual shop, and hence the industry’s supply 
side consists of the physical shop, and the new firm’s virtual shop. The value of 
  
rp  for which the old firm is 
indifferent between charging   p p = rp , and charging   p p =
) 
p p , given   a
= 1 , 0( ) and   pvn £ rvn , is   pos , i.e. 
                                                 
14 The ability to raise price above marginal cost. 
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p (p o
s
( l); c p ) l/ 2 + 1 - l[ ]ºp () p p ; c p ) 1 - l( ). We assume that when the old firm is indifferent between selling to both 
consumers types and selling only to old consumers, it chooses the latter. 
 
Proposition 1: If 
  
a = 1 , 0( ), then: (i)    pvn* = ) p v ; (ii) 
  
  
pp
* =
rp  Ü   p o
s ( l) < rp
) 
p p  Ü   rp £ p o
s ( l)
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
where   po
s(.) is decreasing, and 
  
po
s(1) = c p .        § 
 
 Since the new firm’s virtual shop charges the lowest price in the market, and given (H.2), it is never 
constrained by consumer search and always charges   
) 
p v . The physical shop also benefits from the market power 
generated by costly search, and from being the only shop old consumers can buy from, by charging a higher price 
than the new firm’s virtual shop. However, it is constrained by consumer search, if it is beneficial to sell to both 
consumer types15. Let 
  
) 
l ( r p ) := (p o
s
)
-1
( rp ) . If   rp  is high, i.e.,   po
s( l ) < rp , or alternatively, if l  is large, i.e., 
  
) 
l ( r p ) < l , the old firm wants to sell to both consumers types, so reduces its price below   
) 
p p  and charges   rp  (figure 
1). If   rp  is low, i.e.,   rp < p o
s
( l ) , or alternatively, if l  is small, i.e.,   l <
) 
l ( rp ) , the old firm wants to sell only to old 
consumers and charges 
  
) 
p p .16 The higher is l , the more willing is the physical shop to lower its price to sell to new 
consumers. From Proposition 1: 
  
  
a10 =
2   Ü   p o
s ( l) < rp
1  Ü   rp £ p o
s ( l)
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
 When the old firm does not open a virtual shop and charges   rp  instead of   
) 
p p , it sells to   l / 2  new 
consumers, earning an additional 
     
p ( r p ; c p ) l / 2( ), the Volume of Sales effect, but loses    - p (
) 
p p ; c p ) - p ( rp ; c p )[ ] 
per old consumer, and a total of 
   
- p (
) 
p p ; c p ) - p ( rp ; c p )[ ]1 - l( ), the per Consumer Profit effect. Thus, the physical 
shop trades-off volume of sales and per consumer profit17. 
                                                 
15 And the threat of a second search by new consumers is credible, i.e., 
   rp <
) 
p p . 
16 When 
  rp < p p
*
 the physical shop could shut its Web site. 
17 The physical shop could price discriminate between new and old consumers, by, e.g., offering coupons at its Web site. It might, however, be reluctant to do so, because when 
informed about them, old consumers could perceive these price differences as unfair. See Sinha (2000) for a discussion of this issue. 
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[Insert figure 1 here] 
 When the physical shop charges 
  
rp , new consumers search only once18; otherwise new consumers may 
search twice, until they find the virtual shop. 
 When only the new firm opens a virtual shop there can be 2 types of price equilibria. In both the virtual shop 
charges   
) 
p v . The physical shop at a Competing equilibrium charges   rp , and at a Segmentation equilibrium charges 
  
) 
p p . The Competing equilibrium occurs when   
rp ,l( ) are large, and the Segmentation equilibrium occurs when 
  rp
,l( ) are small. 
 Next we examine the case where both firms open virtual shops, and hence the industry’s supply side 
consists of a physical shop and 2 virtual shops. The level of   rp  for which the old firm is indifferent between its 
physical shop selling to both consumer types, and selling only to old consumers, given 
  
a = 1, 1( ) and   pt £ rt , 
  t= v n ,v o , is   pm
s , i.e., 
   
p (
) 
p v ; cv ) l/ 3( )+ p(p ms ( l,Dc ); c p ) l/ 3 + 1 - l[ ]º p() p v ; c v ) l/ 2( )+ p( ) p p ; c p ) 1 - l( ). We assume 
that when the old firm is indifferent between its physical shop charging 
  p p
= rp , and charging   p p =
) 
p p , it chooses 
the latter; and that for    Dc = c p ,     2 < p (
) 
p v ; cv )/ p(
) 
p p ; c p ) , which can be interpreted as the Large Cost Reduction 
Opportunities case. The value of   Dc  for which    p (
) 
p v ; cv )/ p (
) 
p p ; c p ) º 2 , is   Dc
c .19 
 
Proposition 2: If 
  
a = 1, 1( ), then: (i)    pvn* = p vo* = ) p v ; (ii) 
  
   
p p
* =
   
) 
p p                                   f o r  D c Î Dc
c , c p[ ]
rp   Ü   p m
s ( l ,Dc ) <r p
) 
p p  Ü  rp £ p m
s ( l, Dc )
 f or  Dc Î 0, Dc
c( )
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
 
where   pm
s (.)  is decreasing in l , increasing in   Dc ,   po
s( l ) £ p m
s ( l, Dc ) , and   pm
s (1,D c ) <
) 
p p .  § 
 
 Note that    pvn
* = p vo
* =
) 
p v  is an expression of Diamond’s (1971) paradox20. From Proposition 2: 
                                                 
18 The option to search serves only as a credible, out of equilibrium threat, constraining the old firm’s price decisions. 
19  Price   
) 
p v  depends on   cv , and thus on   Dc . If    2 < p(
) 
p v ; cv )/ p (
) 
p p ; cp ) ,   D c
c
£ c p , whereas if    p (
) 
p v ; cv )/ p (
) 
p p ; c p ) £ 2 ,   D c
c
= c p . 
20 Low cost shops charge the monopoly price, regardless of how low the search cost is, and how many shops there are. See Davis & Holt (1996) for experimental evidence. 
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a11 =
2                                   f or  Dc Î Dc
c , cp[ ]
3  Ü   p m
s ( l, Dc ) < rp
2   Ü   r p £ p m
s ( l, D c )
 f o r  Dc Î 0, D c
c( ) 
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
 
 When the old firm opens a virtual shop, it faces another per Consumer Profit effect, now with respect to 
new consumers, besides the Volume of Sales effect, 
  
p ( rp ; c p )  l/6( ), and the previous per Consumer Profit effect 
with respect to old consumers, 
   
- p (
) 
p p ; c p ) - p ( rp ; c p )[ ] 1 - l( ). If its physical shop charges   rp  instead of   
) 
p p , half 
of the new consumers it sells to,     l /6 , would otherwise buy from its own virtual shop, causing a loss of 
   
- p (
) 
p v ; c v ) - p ( rp ; c p )[ ]l/6( ). This additional effect causes the old firm to only want to reduce its physical shop’s 
price below 
  
) 
p p  to attract new consumers, if cost reduction is small, i.e.,   Dc £ Dc
c . Otherwise, the old firm prefers to 
sell to new consumers only from its virtual shop. And when the old firm’s physical shop does reduce its price to 
attract new consumers, it does so for higher reservation price values than when it does not open a virtual shop, 
  po
s £ p m
s  (figure 2). Even when all consumers have Internet access,   l = 1 , if cost reduction is small, and   pm
s < rp , 
the old firm still sells from the physical shop,   pm
s (1,D c ) <
) 
p p , since this allows it to have a new consumer share of 
  2l/3  instead of   l/2 . 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
 When both firms open virtual shops there is a Competing and a Segmentation equilibrium. A Competing 
equilibrium, exists when   Dc  is small and   
rp ,l( ) are large, and a Segmentation equilibrium exists when either   Dc  
takes intermediate values and 
  
rp ,l( ) are small, or when   Dc  is large 
 The price equilibria of case 
  
a = 1 , 1( ) are different from other search theory equilibria where firms must 
choose whether to sell only to high reservation price consumers, or to sell also to low reservation price consumers 
(e.g., Braverman (1980), Burdett & Judd (1983), Rob (1985), Salop & Stiglitz (1977), Varian (89), Wilde & 
Schwartz (1979)), because the old firm’s problem is not just whether to sell to low reservation price consumers, but 
also how to sell to them, since it can do so either through its virtual or its physical shop. 
 Next we examine the case where only the old firm opens a virtual shop, and hence the industry’s supply side 
consists of the old firm’s physical and virtual shops. 
 12
 
Proposition 3: If 
  
a = 0 , 1( ), then: (i)    p vo* = ) p v ; (ii)    p p* =
) 
p p .      § 
 
 Now since the old firm is alone in the industry, it has no incentive to reduce its physical shop’s price below 
  
) 
p p . Any new consumer its physical shop might attract is stolen from its virtual shop, where per consumer profit is no 
smaller. And, if all consumers have Internet access,   l = 1 , since   rp <
) 
p p , the physical shop has zero sales, which 
could be interpreted as Shutting Down. From Proposition 3:   a 01 = 1 . 
 When only the old firm opens a virtual shop there is a Segmentation equilibrium. 
 Table 1 summarizes the price equilibria’s main features. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 Next we order the equilibrium price distributions for the various stage 1 decision profiles. The market 
equilibrium price distribution when in stage 1 firms play 
  
an , ao( ) is   F a nao (.) ;    F' (.) p F (.)  means “distribution     F (.)  
dominates distribution     F ' (.)  in the first-order stochastic sense”.
21 
 
Proposition 4: (i)   F10 p F01 p F 00 ; (ii)   F11 p F01         § 
 
 Since   F00  dominates all other distributions, if at least 1 virtual shop opens, prices fall due to 2 effects. The 
Cost Reduction effect is the fall on prices caused by the production cost reduction induced by e-commerce. The 
Price Competition effect is the fall on prices induced by the physical shop lowering its price to compete for new 
consumers with the new firm’s virtual shop. If the new firm opens a virtual shop prices fall, since   F10 p F00  and 
  F
11
p F01 . If the old firm opens a virtual shop, prices only fall for sure if it is the only virtual shop,   F
01
p F 00 . When 
the new firm opens a virtual shop, the old firm opening a virtual shop puts more weight on the left tail of the price 
distribution. But since   po
s £ p m
s , the physical shop charges a no lower price than when it has no virtual shop. Thus, 
  F11 and   F10  are not comparable in the first-order stochastic sense. 
 
3.2 Stage 1: The Opening of Virtual Shops Game 
 In this sub-section we characterize the equilibrium opening rule and establish existence of equilibrium. 
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 Firm j’s net profit when in stage 1 firms play 
  
an , ao( ), and after both firms and play optimally is   Va n ao
j . The 
difference between firm j’s net profits when it opens a virtual shop, and when it does not, given that firm j plays 
    d = 0 , 1  in stage 1 is     D1|d
j , e.g.,   D1|1
o = V 11o -V 10o  and   D1|1
n = V 11n -V 01n =V 11n . Firm j’s Expected Incremental Profit of 
opening a virtual shop is 
   
S j := a ¢ j D1|1
j + 1 - a ¢ j ( )D1|0j ,   ¢ j ¹ j . 
 Firm j’s optimal stage 1 decision is to open a virtual shop if its expected incremental profit is positive. 
 
Proposition 5: Equilibrium exists.          § 
 
 Given the range of values the 
  
S j ’s can take, virtually any profile of decisions to open a virtual shop can be 
an equilibrium. In section 4 we describe equilibrium profiles for particular cases. 
 
4 Incentives to Open Virtual Shops 
 In this section we discuss the firms’ incentives to open virtual shops. We show that if cost reduction is small, 
the new firm opens a virtual shop when the old firm does, and also when the old firm does not; otherwise the old firm 
may open a virtual shop when the new firm does not. 
 We start by discussing how opening a virtual shop impacts the new and old firms’ profits. Since the new firm 
has no physical shop, opening a virtual shop enables it to sell to new consumers. The Business Creating effect, is 
the increase in the new firm’s profit from opening a virtual shop, 
  
p (
) 
p v ; c v ) l/a( ). The impact of opening a virtual 
shop on the old firm’s profit can be decomposed in 3 effects. The old firm can sell to new consumers through its 
physical shop. But, if it opens a virtual shop it can sell to them at a lower cost. The Cost Reduction effect, is the 
increase in the old firm’s profit from selling to new consumers through its virtual shop, instead of its physical shop, 
  
p (
) 
p v ; c v ) - p( p p* ; c p )[ ]l/m c( ), where   l/m c  is the proportion of new consumers that buy from the old firm’s virtual 
shop, but that would buy from the physical shop if the old firm did not open a virtual shop. By opening a virtual shop 
when the new firm also does, the old firm improves its ability to sell to new consumers. The Market Penetration 
effect, is the increase in the old firm’s profit, due to the rise in its new consumers’ share, from opening a virtual shop 
                                                                                                                                                    
21 Distribution    F (.)  Dominates distribution    ¢ F (.)  in the First-Order Stochastic sense if   F(.) £ ¢ F (.) , for all p. 
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when the new firm also does, 
  
p (
) 
p v ; c v ) l/m p( ), where   l/m p  is the proportion of new consumers that buy from the 
old firm’s virtual shop, but that would buy from the new firm’s virtual shop if the old firm did not open a virtual shop. 
By opening a virtual shop when the new firm also does, the old firm can sell to new consumers through its virtual 
shop, and have its physical shop sell only to old consumers. The Price Discrimination effect, is the increase in the 
old firm’s profit from switching from a Competing to a Segmentation equilibrium, 
  
p (
) 
p p ; c p ) - p ( rp ; c p )[ ]1 - l( ).22 
 The next lemma orders the firms incremental payoffs. The value of   Dc  for which     p (
) 
p v ; cv )/ p (
) 
p p ; c p ) º 3 /2 , 
is    
( 
D c ( 3 /2 ) . 
 
Lemma 1: (i) If 
   
Dc Î 0 ,
( 
D c ( 3/2 )( ), then     D1|0o < V 11n , and thus     ma x D1|0
o , D1|1
o{ }< V 11n £ V 10n . (ii) If     Dc Î Dcc , c p( ] and 
  
po
s( l ) < rp , then     V 11
n = V 10
n <D1|0
o , and thus     D1|1
o <V 10
n < D1|0
o . (iii)    
( 
D c (3 /2 ) < Dc
c .   § 
 
 Since the new firm’s consumer share is no bigger when the old firm opens a virtual shop than when it does 
not:   V11
n £ V 10
n . When both firms open a virtual shop, the Business Creating effect dominates the Market 
Penetration, Cost Reduction, and Price Discrimination effects:     D1|1
o £ V 11
n , and thus     D1|1
o £ V 11
n £V 10
n . 
 Expression   V1d
n -D1|0
o ,     d = 0 , 1 , equals the difference between the Business Creating and the Cost 
Reduction effects. If   Dc  is small, i.e.,    D c <
( 
D c ( 3/2 ) , the Business Creating effect dominates the Cost Reduction 
effect,     D1|0
o < V 1 1
n , and thus: 
   
ma x D1|0
o , D1|1
o{ }< V 11n £ V 10n . If however,   Dc  is large, i.e.,   Dcc < Dc , and the physical shop 
competes for new consumers, i.e., 
  
po
s
( l ) < rp  or alternatively   
) 
l ( r p ) < l , the Cost Reduction effect dominates the 
Business Creating effect,     V 10
n < D1|0
o . Furthermore, for 
    
a = 1 , 0( ) the model has a Competing equilibrium, and for 
  
a = 1 , 1( ) a Segmentation equilibrium. Thus,   V11n = V 10n , and consequently:     D1|1o <V 11n = V 10n <D1|0o . 
                                                 
22 The Cost Reduction effect is present in   D 1|0
o
, and in   D 1|1
o
 if   po
s £ r p ; the Market Penetration effect is present in   D 1|1
o
 if   rp < po
s  for   D c
c
< D c , and if    
rp Ï p o
s , p m
s[ ) for 
  D c £ Dc
c
; the Price Discrimination effect is present in   D 1|1
o
 if   po
s £ r p  for   D c
c < D c , and if    
rp Î p o
s , p m
s[ ) for   D c £ Dcc . 
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 Next we characterize the opening of virtual shops equilibrium profiles, for Lemma 1’s 2 cases. To focus on 
pure strategy equilibria, we assume that when a firm is indifferent between opening and not opening a virtual shop, it 
chooses the former23. We assume also that 
   
0 £ m ax D1|0
o , V 10
n{ }, which rules out    a * = 0 , 0( ). Let   w := l , c p ,D c , K ,rp( ) 
 
Proposition 6: (i) If
   
Dc Î 0 ,
( 
D c ( 3/2 )( ), then: 
  
  
a* =
1,0( ) Ü  w |D1|1o < 0{ }
1 ,1( ) Ü  w |0 £ D1|1o{ }
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
(ii) If 
    
Dc Î Dc
c , c p( ] and   pos( l ) < rp , then: 
  
  
a* =
0,1( )  Ü   w |V 10n < 0 £D1|0o{ }
1,0( )  Ü   w |D1|1o < 0 £ V 10n{ } 
1 ,1( )  Ü   w |0 £ D1|1o{ }          
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
 
            § 
 
 If   Dc  is small, the new firm opens a virtual shop when the old firm does, and also when the old firm does not: 
    D1|1
o < 0 . We interpret this as the old firm having less incentive to open a virtual shop. 
[Insert figure 3 here] 
 For 
   
l, Dc( )Î 0 ,
) 
l c ( rp )( )´ 0 , ( D c( 3 /2 )( ),     D1|1o  and   V10n  are increasing in   l ,Dc ,( ), and decreasing in   K  (figure 3 
(i)). If 
  
l , Dc( ) are small,    D1|1o < 0 £ V 10n , and thus   a
* = 1 ,0( ); for larger values of   l , Dc( ),    0 £ D1|1
o , and thus 
  
a* = 1 ,1( ). And although the model is static, this could explain why typically new firms opened virtual shops before 
old firms. Initially, 
  
l , Dc( ) were small because few consumers had Internet access, and firms did not fully understand 
the new technology. Overtime, more consumers gained access to the Internet, and firms learned how to use the new 
technology. 
 If however, 
  l
, Dc( ) are large, the old firm may open a virtual shop when the new firm does not: 
  V10
n < 0 £ D1|0
o .  
                                                 
23 Although Proposition 6 is not exhaustive, an equilibrium in pure strategies does exist for all parameter  values. 
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 For 
    
l, Dc( )Î ) l c ( rp ) ,1( ]´ Dcc , c p( ],     D1|0o ,     D1|1o , and   V10n , are increasing in   l , Dc( ), and decreasing in   K  (figure 
3: (ii)). If 
  
l , Dc( ) are larger than 
   
) 
l c ( rp ), Dc
c( ) but not by much,   V10n < 0 £ D1|0o , and thus   a* = 0 ,1( ); for larger values 
of 
  
l , Dc( ), again     0 £ D1|1o , and thus   a
* = 1 ,1( ).  
 The model shows how the old firm might have less incentive to open a virtual shop if cost reduction is small. 
But, if cost reduction is large, the old firm need not have less incentive. In fact, it can choose to open a virtual shop 
when the new firm does not. 
 It has been claimed that an old firm may be reluctant to use e-commerce for fear of its virtual shop, with 
supposedly a lower per consumer profit, stealing business from its physical shop, i.e., Cannibalization24. Note first 
that cannibalization is part of the Cost Reduction effect. If a virtual shop has lower costs than a physical shop, and 
market power, this intra-firm transfer of new consumers is profitable 25. Second, if an old firm opens a virtual shop it 
can increase its new consumers’ share, Market Penetration effect, and price discriminate between new and old 
consumers, Price Discrimination effect, both of which are also profitable 26. In the next section we add some 
comments on this issue. 
 
5 Firm Asymmetry 
 In this section, we discuss how a possible asymmetry between the new and old firm with respect to the new 
technology, affects the firms’ pricing behavior and incremental profits. 
 We assumed that the new and old firm are equally capable of achieving the new technology’s cost 
reduction. However, if virtual shops require new forms of organization that take advantage of the new technology’s 
low cost of information processing and transmission, if integrating virtual and physical shop retailing is hard, and if old 
firms’ employees resist the new technology because it devalues their skills, the new firm might achieve larger 
                                                 
24 Toys”R”Us invested $80 million t o launch a virtual division, but Robert Mogg, the man in charge, resigned, claiming that the firm was afraid of competing with its own physical 
shops (El País, September 5, 1999). Alba et al. (1997): “E-commerce offers an advantage to retailers that have low penetration (…). On the other hand, companies with high 
penetration might experience significant cannibalization of its in-shop sales, making e-commerce less attractive”. 
25 Baseball Express, claims that its Web site stole sales from its catalogue, but t hat selling on the Web is more profitable (The New York Times, September, 2, 1999). 
26 Ward & Morganosky (2000) and Ward (1999) also arrive to a negative conclusion on cannibalization, although for different reasons. 
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retailing cost reductions than the old firm. To model this asymmetry let   cvo = c p -   1
-e( )D c , where   e Î 0 , 1[ ] 
indicates the efficiency loss of the old firm relative to the new firm. 
 The firms’ pricing behavior remains unchanged, except for 
  
a = 1 , 1( ), where 
  
pvo
* = m i n rvo ,
) 
p vo{ }, 
  
) 
p vo Î
) 
p v ,
) 
p p[ ). This implies that there may be price dispersion among virtual shops27. 
 Now     D1|0
o < V 11
n , if   Dc  is small, or, if   Dc  is large but e  is also large (figure 4). And     V 10
n < D1|0
o , if   Dc  is large 
and e  is small. And for e  large enough,     D1|0
o < V 1 1
n  for all values of   Dc . 
[Insert figure 4 here] 
 The Cost Reduction effect becomes 
  
p m i n rvo ,
) 
p vo{ }; c vo( )-p p p* ; cp( )[ ]l/m c( ), which can be negative if   rvo  
is small and   cvo  large, giving some justification to the fear of Cannibalization. The Market Penetration effect 
  
p m i n rvo ,
) 
p v o{ }; cv o( )l/m p( ) also becomes smaller. 
 
6 Endogenous Reservation Prices 
 In this section we add to the model, a third stage where reservation prices are determined, given consumers’ 
search and waiting costs. The game consists of 3 stages. The first 2 unfold as in the basic model. In stage 3 
consumers make their search and purchase decisions; then delivery takes place, agents receive their payoffs, and the 
market closes. 
 To complete the model we introduce the following costs. Visiting the physical shop involves cost, 
  
s Î 0 ,+¥( ), which includes the opportunity cost of the time spent, and associated expenses like driving. Visiting a 
Web site involves cost, s - Ds , which includes the opportunity cost of the time spent, and associated expenses like 
phone calls and Internet fees, and where, 
  
Ds Î 0 ,s( ), is the search cost reduction induced by the new technology. 
Waiting for delivery of a product bought from a virtual shop involves cost, d , that results from deferring 
consumption. Searching Web sites is instantaneous, a consumer may observe any number of prices, and may at any 
                                                 
27 See Baye & Morgan (2000) and Ayer & Pazgal (2000) for alternative ways of generating price dispersion on-line. 
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time accept any offer received to date. Let     
S ( p ) := D ( t ) d tp
¥
ò . The surplus of a consumer that buys from a type t 
shop at price   pt , is     S ( p t ) - u t , where   ut = s  if   t= p , and   ut = d  if   t= v n ,v o . Let   DS := S (
) 
p v ) - S (
) 
p p ) . 
 Old consumers, and new consumers when 
  
a = 0 , 0( ), visit the physical shop, and if offered a price   p £ r  buy 
and receive the product, getting a surplus of   S(p) - s . When   
a ¹ 0, 0( ), new consumers first visit a Web site chosen 
at random: (H.1).28 Then, they decide if they accept the best offer at hand and terminate search; or if they reject it, 
retaining the option to recall it later, and visit one of the other shop’s Web sites. If new consumers have visited all 
shops, they accept the offer with the highest surplus. 
 A consumer's information set just after his k-th search step, consists of all previously observed prices. A 
consumer’s stage 3 strategy,   s , is a stopping rule, that for any sequence of observations, says if search should stop 
or continue. A consumer's payoff is the expected consumer surplus, net of the search expenditure. 
 A subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is: a stopping rule for new consumers, and an opening and a pricing 
rule, for each shop and firm type, 
    
a j
* , p t
* , s *( ) j = n , o ; t = vn , v o , p{ }, such that: 
(E.0) Given any a and   pt , new consumers choose   s
*  to maximize net expected surplus; 
(E.1) Given any a, and   s* , firms choose   pt
*  to solve problems: 
  
max pvn  V
n  and 
    
ma x { p vo , p p}  V
o ; 
(E.2) Given   s*  and   pt
* , firms choose 
  
aj
*  to solve problem: 
  
maxa
j
V j . 
 Next we characterize the new consumers equilibrium search behavior for 
  
a ¹ 0, 0( ). 
 When 
  
a = 1 , 0( ), 0 ,1( ), new consumers’ search may involve 3 steps. In step 3, consumers know both prices, 
and the optimal strategy is to accept   pt , if   S(pt ) - ut ³ S ( p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t . In step 2, a consumer who was offered   pt  at the 
shop he choose to visit at random in step 1, gains 
  
S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S ( p t ) + u t[ ] by searching. Search is optimal if and only 
if 
  
s - Ds < S ( p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S (p t ) + u t[ ]. Let   rta na o  equate the marginal search cost, s - Ds , to the marginal benefit, 
when firms play 
  
an , ao( ) in stages 1: 
                                                 
28 This first step is usually absent in the search literature since it is assumed that consumers get their first price observation for free. 
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S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S ( rt
a na o ) + u t[ ]= s - Ds    ¢ t ¹ t        (1) 
The new consumers’ optimal search rule is to accept offer   pt  and terminate search, if   pt £ rt
a n a o , and reject offer 
  pt  and proceed to step 3, if   pt > rt
a n a o .29 Equation (1) defines implicitly reservation price function,   rt
a na o = R t
a n a o ( .) , 
which is increasing in   p ¢ t . Also,   Rt
an ao (p p ,s ,Ds ,d ) ,   t= v n ,v o , are increasing in s , and decreasing in Ds  and d , and 
  
Rp
a
n
a
o (p t ,Ds ,d ) ,   t= v n ,v o , is increasing in d , and decreasing in Ds . It is straightforward to show that the maximum 
price for which new consumers accept the physical shop’s offer in step 3, is strictly smaller than 
  
rp
10 . Thus the 
physical shop cannot charge a price higher than 
  
rp
10 , expecting that it will be rejected in step 2, but accepted in step 3. 
If   pvn
* = p vo* ,   rvn
10 = rvo
01 . 
 The next lemma establishes the parameter restrictions required for   rp
a na o <
) 
p p  and (H.2). 
 
Lemma 2: (i) If Ds < d , then   p t < rp
a n a o ,   t= v n ,v o . (ii) If d < 2s - Ds , then   p p < rt
a n a o ,   t= v n ,v o . (iii) If 
  d < DS + Ds , then   rp
a na o <
) 
p p .          § 
 
 From Lemma 2: (i)-(ii), (H.2) follows from search and waiting for delivery being costly. Since new 
consumers have access to lower cost shops, and from Lemma 2: (iii), if waiting for delivery is not too costly, new 
consumers only accept buying from the physical shop for a lower price than old consumers: 
  
rp <
) 
p p < r . From now 
on let 
  
d Î Ds , Ds + m i n DS ,2 s - Ds( ){ }( ). 
 When 
  
a = 1 , 1( ), new consumers’ search may consist of 4 steps. Steps 3 and 4 are similar to steps 2 and 3 of 
the previous 2 cases. In step 2, there are 2 Web sites to sample. Let   S(p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t < S ( p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t . If 
  S(pt ) - ut < S (p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t , a new consumer who is offered   pt , gains   S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S ( p t ) + u t[ ] by sampling shop   ¢ t , 
and gains 
  
S(p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t - S( p t ) + u t[ ] by sampling shop   ¢ ¢ t . If   S(p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t £ S (p t ) - u t < S (p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t , new consumers’ 
                                                 
29 See Reinganum (1979) or Benabou (1993). 
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expect to gain 
  
S(p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S ( p t ) + u t[ ]/2  by searching, since they reject shop   ¢ ¢ t ’s offer. The optimal search rule is 
to hold reservation price   rt
11 , which equates the marginal benefit to the marginal cost: 
 
  
1
2
S( p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t - S ( rt
11 ) + u t[ ]+ 12 S ( p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t - S ( rt11 ) + u t[ ]= s - Ds   Ü   S ( rt11 ) -u t < S ( p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t 
1
2
S ( p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t -S ( rt
11) + u t[ ]= s -D s                              Ü   S( p ¢ ¢ t ) - u ¢ ¢ t £ S ( rt11 ) - u t < S ( p ¢ t ) - u ¢ t 
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
 (2) 
Equation (2) also defines implicitly reservation price function,   Rt
11(.), which is non-decreasing in   p ¢ t  and   p ¢ ¢ t . As 
before, it is straightforward to show that the maximum price for which new consumers accept the physical shop’s 
offer, is smaller in step t  than in step t + 1 , t = 2, 3 . Lemma 2 holds, and if 
  
s < S (
) 
p p ) + Ds( )/2 , in equilibrium 
consumers always have a strictly positive net surplus. 
 Equilibrium prices are as in section 3 and Proposition 5 holds. 
 We conclude this section by explaining the role of the assumptions that consumers do not know beforehand 
to which type of shops the Web sites correspond, that the physical shop has a Web site, and that when there are 
virtual shops, new consumers must canvass prices through the Web. In Reinganum (1979) and Benabou (1993), 
firms have different costs, play pure strategies, and consumers do not know the firms’ costs c. Thus, although 
consumers know the firms’ equilibrium price rule   p
*( .) , they do not know the firms’ equilibrium prices,   p
* ( c ) , and 
have to search to learn them. In our model consumers know 
  
c p,cv( ). Thus, the first 2 assumptions ensure that 
meaningful search occurs. Alternatively, consumers could not know 
  
c p,cv( ). This would mean developing a more 
complicated incomplete information game. If when there are virtual shops, we allow new consumers to choose 
weather to canvass prices through the Web, the Competing Equilibrium becomes non-generic, unless we also make 
new consumers heterogeneous with respect to, e.g., d , which has an expository cost. Finally, although these 
assumptions are intended to ensure meaningful search in a simple setting, they are not without justification, since as 
we argue in footnotes 9 and 10, some consumers in some markets behave similarly. 
 
7 Information Goods 
 In this section we discuss the price equilibria for the case where d = 0 . We argue that for this case, virtual 
shops’ prices may be higher than the physical shop’s price. 
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 Restriction, 0 < Ds < d , potentially rules out information goods, for which d  is small, possibly zero. So 
assume d = 0 . From (1),   Rp
an ao (p t ,s ,Ds ,d ) < p t ,   t= v n ,v o . Lemma 2: (ii) and (iii) holds. 
 Equilibrium prices are as in section 3, with an important difference. When 
  
a = 1,0( ) and    p os < r p , or   a = 1 , 1( ) 
and     
p m
s < rp , if 0 < Ds < d ,    p t
* =
) 
p v < rp = p p
* , whereas if d = 0 ,    p p
* = r p <
) 
p v = p t
* ,   t= vn,vo . If buying from a 
virtual shop is more convenient than buying from a physical shop, the physical shop must charge a lower price than 
virtual shops to sell to new consumers. 
 Case d = 0  illustrates an intuitive point. Functionally identical goods sold through different retailing 
technologies, acquire different attributes. E-commerce reduces prices through the Price Competition and Cost 
Reduction effects. If in addition consumers value negatively e-commerce’s attributes, relative to those of other 
retailing technologies, consumers will only buy on-line if compensated by lower prices, which pushes prices further 
down. If however, consumers value positively e-commerce’s attributes, they will pay for the convenience of buying 
on-line, and the net effect can be such that prices are higher on-line than off-line. 
 
8 Related Literature 
 This section inserts the paper on the literature. Our paper relates to 3 literature branches. First, to the e-
commerce marketing literature: Alba, Lynch, Weitz, Janiszewski, Lutz, Sawyer & Wood (1997), Bakos (1997), Lal 
& Sarvary (1998), Peterson, Balasubramanian, & Bronnenberg, (1997), Zettelmeyer (1997). Bakos (1997) presents 
a model of circular product differentiation, where consumers search for prices and product characteristics. All 
consumers have Internet access. If search costs for price and product information are separated, and if e-commerce 
lowers the former, prices decrease; if it lowers the latter, prices can increase. 
 Second, our paper relates to the literature that analyzes competition between alternative retailing 
technologies: Balasubramanian (1998), Bouckaert (2000), Friberg, Ganslandt & Sandstrom (2000), Legros & Stahl 
(2000), and Michael (1994). Balasubramanian (1998) and Bouckaert (2000) use a model of circular product 
differentiation to analyze competition between catalogue and physical shop retailing. Physical shops are located on 
the circumference, and catalogue firms at the center of the circle. The presence of a catalogue firm lowers prices, 
and the number of physical shops in the market. 
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 Third, our paper relates to the advertising and markets for information literatures: Baye & Morgan (1998), 
Caillaud & Jullien (2000), Ellison & Ellison (2001), Iyer & Pazgal (2000), and Kephart & Greenwald (1999). Baye & 
Morgan (1998) examine the interaction between markets for information and the product market they serve. They 
show that the product market can exhibits price dispersion even if consumers are fully informed. Kephart & 
Greenwald (1999) investigate the impact of shopbots on markets. Shopbots allow users to choose the number of 
searches, and make search cost depend only weakly on the number of searches, i.e., nonlinear, leading to a more 
extensive search. 
Appendix 
 In the appendix we prove the lemmas and propositions contained in the main text, and 2 auxiliary lemmas A1, and 
A2. 
 
Lemma A1: If 
   
a ¹ 0 , 0( ), then: (i) for 
   
¢ p Î rt , + ¥( ) 
  
  
pt
* =
min rt ,
) 
p v{ }  Ü   c t £ rt
¢ p                  Ü   r t < c t
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
    t = vn,  vo  
(ii) for 
   
¢ ¢ p Î rp , + ¥( ) 
  
  
pp
* =
rp o r  
) 
p p  Ü   c p £ rp
¢ ¢ p          Ü   rp < c p
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
(iii)
  
pvn
* = p vo
* < p p
* . 
Proof: (i) First we establish the result for   pvn
* , and for   pvo
*  when 
  rp < p p
* . We proceed in 2 steps. In step 1 we 
show that 
   
p t
* = m i n rt ,
) 
p v{ } for   c v £ rt . Let    ) p v < rt . Suppose    p t* ¹
) 
p v . If    p t
* <
) 
p v , there is a   e > 0  sufficiently small 
such that   p t
* +e < rt . Thus, if a shop deviates and charges   p t
* + e , it loses no customers, and by strict quasi-
concavity of the per consumer profit, profit rises. Thus,    
) 
p v £ p t* . If    
) 
p v < p t
* , by definition of    
) 
p v , if a shop deviates 
and charges    p t
*
=
) 
p v , it increases its profit. Thus,    p t
* £
) 
p v , and therefore,    p t
*
=
) 
p v . Now let    rt £
) 
p v . Suppose 
  p t
* ¹ rt . Shops can make a non-negative profit so they never charge   rt < p t
* . And, if they charge   p t
* < rt , they 
could, as before, increase profit by rising price to   rt . It follows that   p t
* = rt  for    rt £
) 
p v , and therefore 
   
p t
* = min rt ,
) 
p v{ } for   c v £ rt . 
 In step 2 we show that 
  
p t
* = ¢ p Î rt , +¥( ) for   rt < cv . If a shop charges   ¢ p Î rt , +¥( ) it has a zero profit; 
otherwise it has a negative profit. 
 Now we establish the result for   pvo
*  when 
  p p
* £ rp . The previous argument applies, since old firm’s virtual 
shop only affects 
  
fp (.) , if it charges   rvo < p vo  instead of   pvo £ rvo , which is never optimal since 
   
p ( p vo ; c v ) l/ 3( )+ p ( p p ; c p ) l/3 + 1 - l[ ]-p ( p p ; c p ) l/ 2 + 1 - l[ ]< 0 . 
(ii) Recall that by assumption 
  
rp <
) 
p p . Case   rp < c p  is similar to (i). So Let   cp £ rp . We proceed in 2 steps. In 
step 1 we observe that by the same arguments as in (i),   rp £ p p
* £
) 
p p . 
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 In step 2 we show that either 
  
p p
* = rp  or   p p
* =
) 
p p . Suppose   
p p
* = p Î rp ,
) 
p p( ). The physical shop’s profit 
is 
  
p ( p ; c p ) 1 - l( ). If a firm deviates and charges   p p* =
) 
p p , it will loose no customers, and by strict quasi-concavity 
of the per consumer profit, profit rises. 
(iii) Suppose 
  p p
* £ p t* ,   t= v n ,v o . Let   p p
* < c p . By (ii)   rp < p p
* £ p t , which violates (H.2). Let   c p £ p p
* . Consider 
  p p
* = p t
* . By (i) and (ii), 
   
rp = p p
* £ p t
* = m i n rt ,
) 
p v{ }, which violates (H.2). Thus,   p t* < p p* .   § 
 
Proposition 1: For 
   
rp , l( )Î c p , ) p p[ ]´ 0 , 1( ],    y
o ( rp , l ) := p ( rp ; c p ) l/ 2 + 1 -l[ ]- p( ) p p ; c p ) 1 - l( ) and 
    y
o ( p o
s ( l); l ) º 0 . 
(i) Follows from (H.2) and Lemma A1: (iii) and (i). 
(ii) We proceed in 3 steps. In step 1 we establish the existence of   po
s . Since   "l ,  y
o ( c p ; l ) < 0 < y
o (
) 
p p ; l ) , and 
   y
o (.)  monotonic in   rp , it follows from the intermediate value theorem that,    "l Î
0 ,1( ), $1 p os Î c p , ) p p( ). The 
implicit function theorem implies that    p o
s = p os( l)  with   po
s(.)  decreasing. 
 In step 2 we establish 
  
p p
* . Follows from Lemma A1: (ii), and the definition of   po
s . 
 In step 3 we establish 
    
p o
s(1) = c p . Follows from   y
o
(c p ;1 ) = 0 .     
 § 
 
Proposition 2: 
For 
   
rp ,l , Dc( )Î c p , ) p p[ ]´ 0 ,1( ]´ 0 , c p( ],    y
m ( rp ; l, Dc ) := p (
) 
p v ; cv ) l/ 3( )+ p( rp ; c p ) l/3 + 1 - l[ ]-p () p v ; cv ) l/ 2( )-  
   
p (
) 
p p ; c p ) 1 - l( ) and    y m ( p ms ( l,Dc ); l , Dc ) º0 . 
(i) As in Proposition 1: (i). 
(ii) We proceed in 7 steps. In step 1 we show that 
    
"Dc Î 0, Dc
c( ]:  p ( ) p v ; cv ) /p () p p ; c p ) £ 2  and 
    
"Dc Î Dc
c , c p( ):  p( ) p v ; c v ) /p( ) p p ; c p ) > 2 . Since    p (
) 
p v ; cv ) /p (
) 
p p ; c p )  is increasing in   Dc , for   Dc = 0  
   
p (
) 
p v ; cv ) /p (
) 
p p ; c p ) < 2 , and for   Dc = c p     2 < p(
) 
p v ; c v ) /p (
) 
p p ; c p ) , it follows from the intermediate value theorem 
that 
   
$1 Dc
c Î 0,c( ]:  p( ) p v ; cv ) /p () p p ; c p ) º 2 . The result follows from the monotonicity of     p (
) 
p v ; cv ) /p (
) 
p p ; c p ) . 
 In step 2 we observe that   y
m (.)  is strictly increasing in   rp ,   
" l , Dc( ),  y m( c p ; l, Dc ) < 0  and 
   
y m (
) 
p p ; l, Dc ) = -lp ( p p
* ; c p) p(
) 
p v ; c v ) /p (
) 
p p ; c p )[ ]- 2{ }/ 6 . 
 In step 3 we establish the existence of   pm
s , 
   
"Dc Î 0, Dc
c( ]. Given steps 1 and 2, it follows from the 
intermediate value theorem that 
   
" l , Dc( ), $1 p ms Î c p , ) p p[ ]. The implicit function theorem implies that 
    p m
s = p m
s ( l, Dc ) , and   pm
s (.)  is strictly decreasing in l , and strictly increasing in   Dc . 
 In step 4 we show that 
   p p
*
=
) 
p p , 
   
"Dc Î Dc
c , c p( ]. Follows from steps 1 and 2. 
 In  step 5 we show that   po
s £ p ms . Note that   y
m = y o - A , 
   
A := l p (
) 
p v ; c v ) + p ( rp ; c p)[ ]/6 . Let 
  
y :=y o -hA,  h Î 0,1[ ]. For   h = 0    y = y o , and that for   h = 1    y = y m . The result follows from   ¶y /¶h < 0 . 
 In step 6 we establish 
  
p p
* . Follows from Lemma A1: (iii), step 4 the definition of   pm
s . 
 In step 7 we establish    p m
s (1, Dc ) <
) 
p p . Follows from   0 < y
m (
) 
p p ;1, D c ) ,    
"Dc Î 0, Dc
c( ].  
 § 
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Proposition 3: Follows from (H.2), the definition of new and old consumers, 
  
p (
) 
p p ,c p ) <p (
) 
p v ,cv ) , and the old 
firm being the only firm.           § 
 
Proposition 4: (i) We proceed in 2 steps. In step 1 we show that   F01 p F 00 . In both cases   p p
* =
) 
p p , but for 
    
a = 0 , 1( ), 
  
pvo
* =
) 
p v <
) 
p p . In step 2 we show that   F
10 p F01 . In both cases 
  
p tv
* =
) 
p v , but for     
a = 1 , 0( ), 
  
p p
* £
) 
p p . 
(ii) For 
   
a = 1, 1( ), the physical shop charges a no higher price, and the old firm’s virtual shop puts more weight on 
  
) 
p v .            § 
 
Proposition 5: Follows from Kakutani’s fixed theorem, since firm j’s best response correspondence, 
     
A j : 0 , 1[ ]´ ) p v , + ¥[ )´ 0 , 1( ]´ 0 , cp( ]´ 0 ,+¥( )® 0 , 1[ ] is upper-hemi continuous in   a ¢ j : 
  
  
A j(a ¢ j ; rp, l, Dc , K ) =
0        Ü   D1|0
j < 0
[ 0 ,1 ]   Ü   D1|0
j = 0
1        Ü   D1|0j > 0
  Ü    D1|0
j = D1|1
j
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
0       Ü   a ¢ j >
) 
a j
[ 0,1]   Ü   a ¢ j =
) 
a j
1       Ü   a ¢ j <
) 
a j
  Ü    D1|0
j > D1|1
j
ì 
í 
ï 
î 
ï ï 
0       Ü   a ¢ j <
) 
a j
[0, 1]  Ü   a ¢ j =
) 
a j
1       Ü   a ¢ j >
) 
a j
  Ü    D1|0
j < D1|1
j
ì 
í 
ï 
î 
ï ï 
ì 
í 
ï 
ï 
ï 
ï 
ï 
ï 
ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
ï 
ï 
ï 
ï 
ï 
          
j, ¢ j = n, o;  ¢ j ¹ j
) 
a j :=
D1|0
j
D1|0
j - D1|1
j
  (A1) 
             
 § 
 
 For 
   
Dc , q( )Î 0 , c p[ )´ 1 , 2[ ],    c( Dc ; q ) := p(
) 
p v ; c v )/ p (
) 
p p ; c p ) - q  and    c (
( 
D c ( q ); q ) º 0 . 
 
Lemma A2: If    D c £
( 
D c( q ) , then   c( Dc ; q ) £ 0 ; if    
( 
D c ( q ) < Dc , then    0 < c ( Dc ; q ) . 
Proof: Since   c(0 ,q ) £ 0 £ c ( c p ,q)  and   c ( . )  is continuous in   Dc , by the intermediate function theorem   "q Î  
   
1 ,2[ ], $ 1 Dc( q ) Î 0,c p( ]:  c( Dc ( q ), q ) º 0 . The result follows from the monotonicity of   c ( . )  in   Dc .  § 
 
Lemma 1: 
(i) First note that   V11n £ V 10n  and     D1|1
o £ V 11
n , and thus     D1|1
o £ V 11
n £V 10
n , follow directly from the expressions of 
  V10
n -V 11
n  and     V 11
n - D1|1
o . From the expression of   V11
n -D1|0
o  and Lemma A2, it follows that     D1|0
o < V 11
n . 
(ii) From the expression of     V 10
n - D1|0
o  and Lemma A2, it follows that   V10
n < D1|0
o .    § 
 
Proposition 6: (i) Let     D1|1
o < 0 . If     D1|0
o £ D1|1
o , by assumption   0 £ V 10
n , and the old firm’s dominant strategy is 
  ao = 0 . By (AI) the new firm’s best response is   an = 1 . If     D1|1
o <D1|0
o , by Lemma 1: (i),     D1|0
o < V 11
n £ V 10
n . If 
    D1|0
o < 0 , the argument is as before. If     0 £ D1|0
o , the new firm’s dominant strategy is   an = 1 . By (AI) the old firm’s 
best response is   ao = 0 . 
(ii) For 
    
a = 1 , 0( ), 1 , 1( ) the model has a competing and segmentation equilibrium, respectively. Thus,   V11n = V 10n . Let 
  V10
n < 0 £ D1|0
o . The new firm’s dominant strategy is   an = 0 . By (AI) the old firm’s best response is   ao = 1 . Let 
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    D1|1
o < 0 £ V 10
n . The new firm’s dominant strategy is   an = 1 . By Lemma 1: (ii) and (AI) the old firm’s best response 
is   ao = 0 . Let   0 £ D1|1
o . By Lemma 1: (ii), the firms’ dominant strategies are:   an = a o = 1 .  § 
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Table 1: Summary of Model’s Price Equilibria 
a  
  pp
*  Share vn Share vo Share p Equilibrium 
  
po
s < rp    rp    l/2  –   l/2 + 1 -l  Competing  
  
1,0( ) 
  
rp £ po
s    
) 
p p  l  –   1 -l  Segmentation 
  
0,1( ) –   
) 
p p  –   l/2    1 -l  Segmentation 
  
pm
s < rp    rp    l/3    l/3    l/3 + 1 -l  Competing  
  Dc £ Dc
c  
  
rp £ p m
s    
) 
p p    l/2    l/2    1 -l  Segmentation 
 
 
  
1,1( ) 
   Dc
c < Dc    
) 
p p    l/2    l/2    1 -l  Segmentation 
 
 
 
 
